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‘More Mighty than the Waves of the
Sea’: Toilers, Tariffs, and the Income
Tax Movement, 1880–1913
Ajay K. Mehrotra
Social movements are at once the symptoms and the instruments of social progress.
Ignore them and statesmanship is irrelevant; fail to use them and it is weak.
Walter Lippmann
In the spring of 1870, John Sherman, the Ohio Republican and powerful Chairman
of the Senate Finance Committee, rose to his feet in the Senate chambers to defend
the federal income tax. Addressing his colleagues who were seeking to dismantle the
income tax laws created during the Civil War, Sherman eloquently explained why
the direct national tax on personal and corporate incomes ought to remain a central
part of the post-Civil-War fiscal order. In his lengthy and passionate speech,
Sherman contended that one of the main reasons to maintain an income tax was
because of its popular appeal. He warned his Senate colleagues that if they repealed
these accepted tax laws, they ‘must expect to meet popular clamor’—a popular
clamor unlike any other.
Not the clamor manufactured in the daily newspapers whose receipts are large and
productive, nor the clamor that comes to us from cities, or from the Union League,
composed of gentlemen among the ablest and best in this country, whom I respect
personally, but you will hear clamor coming from the mass of the people who will
complain of injustice and wrong, and their voice, although not often heard in the way
of petitions, when it comes to you is more mighty than the waves of the sea.1
Although Sherman’s defense of the Civil War income tax system ultimately failed to
carry the day in the early 1870s, his prescient comments would, in the decades to
come, accurately describe the popular appeals for progressive income taxes.
Among the cacophony of voices that made up the ‘popular clamor’ that supported
progressive income taxes, none was perhaps more significant, or as problematic, as
organized labor. Members of the working class bore a disproportionate share of the
tax burden under the prevailing nineteenth-century system of indirect taxation. The
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tariff and the federal excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco fell disproportionately
upon ordinary, working class Americans. Through their unions, working class
individuals appeared to be a natural constituency for tax reformers and lawmakers
who were seeking to use the income tax not only to revise the tariff, but to build
a new fiscal polity—one based primarily on the direct and progressive taxation of
income.
Labor, however, was slow to support the income tax movement. Divided over
issues such as tariff reform, and distracted by other seemingly more appealing
remedies such as Henry George’s single tax, trade unions were hesitant in advancing
the income tax cause. It was only after protectionism came under increased scrutiny
in the last decades of the nineteenth century that labor organizations were able to
suppress their own internal divisions over the tariff and forge a fleeting political
alliance with other members of the producing class, namely farmers, to push for a
national income tax. Once the income tax movement was able to move from the
margins of political discourse to the center stage of national party politics, tax
reformers were able again to point to the ‘popular clamor’ supporting graduated
income taxes.
In an effort to understand the role that organized labor played in building the
social foundations of the new fiscal order, this article explores how and why labor
was a problematic constituency for the income tax movement. By examining what
national leaders and rank-and-file members of trade unions said and did about
taxation, this article contends that labor organizations played a significant—though
halting—part in helping to establish a fairer and more effective modern system of
taxation. Organized labor’s belated support for progressive income taxes, moreover,
illustrates how the history of American taxation is not a linear and continuous story
of anti-statist tax resistance.2 Similarly, labor’s eventual demands for a national
income tax challenge the notion that the American labor movement, through its
continuous collisions with legal institutions, became preoccupied with achieving its
goals solely through voluntary private ordering.3 Organized labor’s support for the
income tax at the turn of the twentieth century thus suggests a much more tenuous
relationship between taxation, ‘voluntarism,’ and an ostensible anti-statist American
culture.
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, organized labor had an ambivalent
reaction to the protective tariff. This ambivalence together with the allure of other
remedies such as Henry George’s single tax prevented labor unions from coalescing
around the income tax movement. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the
growing federal surplus and the increasing visibility of concentrated wealth provided
income tax proponents with an opportunity to challenge the dominance of the tariff
and the entire system of indirect taxation. As part of this challenge, laborers united
with farmers to push for numerous political and economic reforms, including a
graduated income tax. Their success in establishing a federal income tax as part of
tariff revision in 1894 was short-lived when the US Supreme Court struck down the
law in the following year. Despite the continued conservative resistance to an income
tax, by the end of the nineteenth century the social forces supporting an income tax
Labor History 167
had already begun to emerge; although it would take nearly two decades before
income tax proponents could claim victory, the ratification of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment in 1913 and the enactment of the first permanent national income tax in that
same year signaled an achievement for the reformers and social movements that
were seeking to create a new fiscal state.
Toilers and the Tariff
From the end of Reconstruction to the onset of the Great Depression, the US system
of public finance underwent a radical transformation. The late nineteenth century
structure of indirect national taxes, associated mainly with the tariff and regressive
excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco, was eclipsed in the early decades of the
twentieth century by a federal income tax that soon accounted for more than half
of all federal tax revenues. In 1880, for example, customs duties and the excise taxes
on alcohol and tobacco made up nearly 90 percent of all federal government receipts.
By 1930, these two types of taxes accounted for less than 25 percent of government
revenues, and the income tax amounted to almost 60 percent of federal government
receipts. This structural shift in public finance ushered in a new fiscal polity, one
premised mainly on progressive income taxes.4
With the protective tariff at its core, the nineteenth-century system of indirect
consumption taxes disproportionately affected ordinary working class Americans. As
consumers, they were the ultimate taxpayers of the import duties that were passed
along by manufacturers and distributors. Though the tariff, as an indirect consump-
tion tax, operated discreetly as part of the everyday cost of living, the unfair and
regressive nature of the tax did not completely escape the notice of many members
of the working class.
In 1883, Conrad Carl, a New York City tailor, described how the tariff exacerbated
the already abysmal living conditions of the American working class. A tailor for
nearly thirty years, Carl had witnessed how the onset of new technology, in his case
the sewing machine, had altered the production process while diminishing wages.
Testifying before a Senate Committee investigating the relations between labor and
capital, Carl explained how his meager earnings were often not enough to provide
for his family; how the grueling intensity of his work day left him ‘no time to eat
dinner;’ how he like other tailors in New York ‘lived in a tenement house four or
five stories high;’ how they could only afford ‘the clothing that they make—the
cheapest of it;’ and how workers from his class were able to save nothing from their
wages.5
Carl elaborated on one of the reasons why he believed that the working class was
in such dire straits. ‘The taxation system is unjust in the United States,’ Carl told the
Senate Committee. ‘It is only indirect taxes, which fall back upon the workingmen.
The workingman has to pay taxes in rent, and in provisions, and so on. He is the
last one that they can fall back upon, and they get the taxes out of him. It is only
the workingman that is the taxpayer, in my opinion, in the United States.’ Asked by
one of the senators whether the federal government could do anything to alleviate
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this unfair fiscal burden, Carl responded that ‘so long as legislation is unjust to the
poor, to tax the poor who have nothing but their daily earnings, to tax them by
indirect taxes, there is no way to better the condition of the workingman.’ Though
Carl was no revolutionary, he warned the national lawmakers not to ignore the
injustices of the American tax system. ‘The indirect taxes are a fraud and a crime
against the workingmen,’ Carl declared, ‘and society will have its punishment sooner
or later for it. … When there lies so great a wrong on the bottom of society as to tax
the laboring man by indirect taxes, there grows wrong after wrong, and it will grow
as high as Babylon’s tower if we do not go against it.’6
Carl’s comments before the Senate Committee echoed what tax reformers had
been arguing for decades. The protective tariff was seen by many as providing an
unfair advantage to select industries, while harming everyday consumers. Yet the
most glaring drawback of the tariff, for those who sought to promote free trade, was
how the levy supported monopoly power. Opponents of protectionism, after all, had
long ago identified the tariff as ‘the mother of all trusts.’ As they saw it, the tariff
simply contributed to higher taxation, while insulating politically privileged indus-
tries from fair competition, and in the process facilitating an inequitable distribution
of wealth.7 For those tax reformers among the working class, the remedy to the evils
of the protective tariff was rather straightforward: use the collective political power
of ‘tillers and toilers’—the greater producing class—to sever the nexus between
political privilege and protected industries.
Some national leaders of the working class recognized that law, and the creation
of new legislation, could be one way—perhaps the best way—to dissolve the
seemingly inexorable link between the tariff and monopoly power, and in the process
to foster the transformation of American public finance. Leaders of the Noble Order
of the Knights of Labor (KOL), the late nineteenth-century organization of farmers
and laborers, commented in 1886 on how the privileged classes dominated the
legislative process, and how any ‘attempt on the part of the people to influence or
create law is met by discontent and opposition.’ But this was not how American
democracy was designed to operate, the labor leaders claimed. In an editorial in the
Knights’ official newsletter, the Journal of United Labor, these leaders wrote, ‘Law
making should be the expression of the will of the people—not as exists, that of the
conclave. Therefore, as a body, the people should become the law-makers and this
right embraces each and every individual.’ Focusing on how the law emanated from
the people, these leaders emphasized the malleability of laws like the tariff. ‘The fact
that man creates law presupposes change of law,’ the editorial observed. ‘Law is
obligatory only so long as it occupies a place on our statute books. The changes of
commercial and domestic affairs attending progressive development call for chang-
ing enactments.’8
It was not only leaders of the producing class who advocated using legal and
political means to address the social and economic inequalities of the time. Rank-
and-file members of the Knights of Labor—ordinary farmers and workers—also
believed that the power of the petition and the vote could be harnessed to attack the
state capitalism that supported the high, protective tariff. With little faith in the
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courts, the grassroots movements for tax reform focused their energies on the
legislative process.
There was perhaps no better representation of the grassroots attempt at legal and
political reform to dismantle the tariff than the letter-writing campaign conducted
by Merlinda Sisins of Pickleville, Michigan. A farmer’s wife and mother of 16, Sisins
was a frequent letter writer to the Journal of United Labor. A self-educated social
commentator, with little means, Sisins proclaimed to speak for all those hard-work-
ing producers who had been marginalized by the elite circles of legal and economic
policymaking.
In her dozen or so letters to the journal, Sisins urged farmers and laborers to unite
as a class to challenge the wealthy and powerful beneficiaries of the tariff. ‘I believe,’
Sisins wrote in her first letter in 1888, ‘the great issues ov this hour tu be the rites
ov the farmers and laborers (for their interests are identical and the same), as ginst
the hydra-headed monster that is suckin our life’s blood—hi taxation and mon-
opoly.’ To slay this monster, Sisins recommended that her readers ‘use that
God-given defence—baptised in the blood ov the Revolutionary War—the ballot
and vote for no man who is tu make or execute the laws in this country who is not
one ov our number and true to our interests.’9
In addition to the ballot, Sisins also recognized the power of petitioning lawmak-
ers. Writing in the summer of 1888, she provided her readers with the text for a
petition requesting that Congressional leaders nominate members of the producing
class for national office. That text read in part,
We the undersigned—farmers, shopkeepers and wage-workers—ask the leadin political
parties ov the kongressional district of tu nominate a kandidate for Kongress
from our Ranks, that we may have konfidence in his Fidelity tu our interests. If neither
ov the leadin parties nominate such a man we will do so ourselves; and we further
pledge our word and sacred honor tu each other not to vote for eny other kongressional
kandidate.10
Petitions like these from farmers, workers, and their organizations, often with more
specific demands, were commonplace in most Congressional discussions over tax
policy.11
While leaders and rank-and-file members of the Knights may have identified the
law and the political arena as a site for addressing the problems of indirect taxation,
the protective tariff remained a divisive issue among organized labor in the late
nineteenth century. Despite the claims of Merlinda Sisins and others, not all
American workers wanted to do away with the tariff. Protectionism, in fact, provided
at least two benefits to many workers. It sheltered industries that would not have
otherwise existed in the face of foreign competition and thereby provided work; and
it also theoretically led to higher wages—a point that pro-tariff Republicans often
raised during congressional debates over free trade.12 This division within the labor
ranks over the tariff clearly extended the longevity of the nineteenth-century
regressive system of indirect national taxation, forestalling in the process the rise of
the income tax regime.
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The divisive nature of the tariff was exacerbated by the neutral stance on the topic
taken by national labor leaders. As the leading labor organization of the 1880s, the
KOL struggled with a persistent tension between the aims of the national leadership
and the activity of local assemblies. In their attempts to build solidarity among the
producing class of workers, farmers, and small manufacturers, national leaders such
as the Knights’ Grand Master Workman Terence Powderly often eschewed militant
tactics and political alliances in favor of a more morally inclined notion of reform.
Nonetheless, local assemblies of the Knights throughout the country often acted
autonomously and took determined political actions that belied the non-political
pronouncements of the national leadership.13
Discussion of the tariff and tax policy more generally was one area where this
fissure between the national organization and the local affiliates was highly evident.
While national leaders of the Order attempted to avoid the divisiveness of the tariff,
rank-and-file members often voiced their differing political positions either through
the publications and meetings of the Knights or more directly through their
government representatives. Although the leadership seemed to recognize that the
tax on imports was a regressive consumption tax falling disproportionately on the
purchasers of everyday commodities, they also realized that the tariff was an issue
that implicated sectional conflict and one that nominally protected the workers of
many industries.14
This dissonance within the organization became increasingly pronounced dur-
ing the late 1880s when the Republican political coalition supporting protection-
ism came under increased pressure. With a large budget surplus taking shape at
the national level, many opponents of the tariff, especially those within the
Democratic Party, began to question the continued need for protectionism. Some
of the benefits derived directly from tariff revenue, namely military pensions,
continued to appease an aging population of Union veterans. But with an
increasing immigrant population in the manufacturing belt, which did not benefit
from pensions, and the growing tensions between industrial workers and their
employers on the shop floor, the tariff seemed to provide little solace for most
workers.15
Nevertheless, even during this critical moment for tariff policy national leaders of
the Knights attempted to remain above the fray. When in 1887 a local assembly
member from Iowa wrote to the Journal of United Labor requesting ‘a synopsis of the
arguments showing the advantages of a high tariff and the disadvantages of free
trade,’ the editors responded with characteristic caution. They admitted that they
had ‘decided opinions on the subject of “protection,” as it is called—opinions which
many other equally well-read members of the Order do not share.’ Because of this
disagreement, the editors replied that ‘it would not be the correct thing to promul-
gate our individual ideas, which would possibly not even find endorsement among
the majority, as the official sentiment of the Order.’ The editors did not, however,
want to minimize the gravity of the tariff issue. ‘There are few topics of more interest
to wage earners than the question of custom house protection to our industries,’ the
editors concluded. ‘Let the different Local Assemblies make this a subject for debate,
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preceded by study.’ Among the important authors and works to consult, the editors
recommended Henry George.16
With the national leadership of the Knights remaining neutral on the tariff, local
assemblies—as they did in many other political matters—acted independently. Just
as local fiscal issues often animated the formation of regional working class political
action, the debate over protectionism pushed workers in certain unions to unify and
take a stand on the tariff.17 For those workers concentrated in the manufacturing belt
of the iron and steel industry, for instance, there was little reason to doubt that the
protection granted to their industry and employers also benefited them. Thus, when
in 1888 the tariff came under attack for even moderate revision by Democratic
lawmakers, Republican supporters of protectionism were quick to carry out their
coalition strategy and rally workers from protected industries. Representative
William McKinley, one of the leaders of the pro-tariff camp, pointed to a petition
sent by the Iron and Steel and Glassblowers assemblies of the Knights and other
unions, to proclaim that he had the support of at least ‘a half million working men
of the United States in opposing’ tariff reduction.18 Although McKinley made no
mention of any opposition to the tariff, and though Democratic lawmakers
attempted to show that protection did not always lead to higher wages, McKinley’s
rhetorical point had been made and tariff reduction in 1888 was soundly defeated.19
The tariff continued to be a divisive issue within the American labor movement
throughout the late nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. Workers in those
industries that were traditionally protected by the tariff continued to support it,
while others believed it had outlived its usefulness in sheltering infant domestic
industries. Some workers, such as Adolph Strasser of the Cigar Makers’ International
Union, believed that free trade would cripple American industries. In his testimony
before the Congressional Industrial Commission in 1899, Strasser admitted that
cigars made more cheaply in Manila, Cuba, and Puerto Rico would ‘crowd our trade
to the wall.’ Citing the lower wages in these foreign lands, Strasser explicitly stated
that American cigar makers ‘could not compete with that article;’ thus they had no
choice but ‘to fight against’ free trade. Other cigar makers believed that while the
tariff may not have been essential for their industry, it was difficult to justify the
arbitrary and political nature of protectionism. ‘The cigar maker is like everyone
else,’ George J. Thompson, one of the leaders of the Cigar Makers’ Union of
Chicago, told the Congressional committee. ‘When he sees other interests protected,
he wants some of it himself.’20
It was not only cigar makers who wanted protection. As we have seen, the iron
and steel industry petitioned lawmakers when tariff revisions were under consider-
ation. Similarly, those involved in the glass industry believed that protection not only
brought higher wages, but was paramount to the existence of their trade. A. M.
Hammett of the Window Glass Cutters League of North America testified that ‘if it
was not for the tariff we could not exist.’ At the very least, protection was said to
provide higher wages. When James Campbell, a former president of the Glass
Workers of America, was asked by a national lawmaker if the ‘scale of wages and
arrangements with proprietors are conditioned considerably by national tariff legis-
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lation,’ Campbell responded that ‘When there is tariff agitation there has always been
a clause inserted in the scale that in case of a reduction of the tariff there will be a
rearrangement of the wages.’ And, conversely, ‘When there is an advance, the
workmen get an advance.’21
Cigar makers, workers involved in the iron and steel industries, and those in glass
manufacturing plainly benefited from the tariff and supported it. But other represen-
tatives of the working class thought that by 1900 the protective tariff had done its
job of shielding infant industries; now it only raised the costs of production by
imposing duties on imported materials and allowing domestic manufacturers to
form industrial combinations. Members of unprotected industries thus ‘had no need
for the protective tariff theory,’ as one shoemaker put it. In fact, for them, ‘the duty’
was a ‘very iniquitous proposition.’22 As early as 1882, the nascent American
Federation of Labor (AFL) even went so far as to renounce officially the protective
tariff in its convention platform. The Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel
Workers, not surprisingly, refused initially to join the AFL because of its anti-tariff
stance. Over time, however, constituent unions acting independently endorsed
protectionism for their respective industries. The tariff thus remained a divisive issue
among laborers throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.23
This rift within the American labor movement over the tariff had a resounding
impact on the development of the new fiscal order. More specifically, this partial
allegiance to the tariff retarded the movement for progressive income taxes by
dividing an important source of political support for the new income tax regime.
Because the calls for an income tax, at least initially, were tied directly to reductions
in the tariff, any effort that maintained import duties was indirectly a blow to those
fighting for a more equitable system of taxation—a system based on the direct
taxation of income rather than the indirect system of regressive consumption and
excise taxes.
This divided fealty to protectionism also symbolized in other ways labor’s unease
with the possibilities of an income tax. The tariff had been a part of American
foreign and economic policy from the early years of the republic, whereas the
income tax was unfamiliar and hence uncertain. As in many other areas of economic
policy, labor leaders were reluctant to address the perceived risks associated with an
untried income tax. Though a national income tax existed in the North during the
Civil War, it was deemed by many then to be strictly an emergency wartime
measure. The direct taxation of income during peacetime thus remained an un-
known and untested phenomenon, and most labor leaders were loath to embrace the
risks associated with such uncertainty. Better to deal with a known evil, some
laborites may have reasoned, than to risk taking on an unknown entity.
An income tax system also carried with it other perceived risks. For an organized
labor movement apparently committed to ‘voluntarism’ and ‘business unionism,’ a
direct income tax managed by the federal government embodied all the fears of a
discretionary state. Even though the Civil War income taxes affected only a small
fraction of the American economic elite, labor leaders could only wonder whether
such power in the hands of lawmakers could one day lead to a more mass-based
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income tax system. An income tax with low exemption levels could easily affect
everyday workers, perhaps more so than the tariff. This fear or mistrust of the
discretionary powers of an emerging administrative state may have certainly con-
tributed to labor’s reluctance to support the shift to an income tax regime.
But it was not just the real and symbolically perceived risks of abandoning the
tariff that held back the income tax forces; other seemingly more radical tax
proposals, namely the single tax, also sapped energy away from the main focus of
replacing the nineteenth-century system of indirect taxes with a more equitable fiscal
order. In its purest form, Henry George’s single tax advocated the exclusive use of
a levy on land values, specifically rent, as the only way both to raise limited amounts
of government revenues and to curb land speculation. George believed that land
speculation was the root cause of nearly all the problems of modern industrial life.
With one simple solution—a tax on land values—George idealistically claimed that
modern society could do away with the unearned profits of an exploitive rentier class
without having to build a regulatory or administrative state.24
The single tax movement, which in its many variants often veered from the initial
pronouncements of Henry George, acted like an irresistible magnet for reform
organizations—a kind of flypaper for social movements. Lured by its anti-capitalist
rhetoric, reform organizations of all kinds were attracted to the single tax, to varying
degrees, as the necessary solution to the social, political, and economic dislocations
of modern industrial capitalism. Labor was seemingly attracted to the single tax for
several reasons. By placing the blame for all of modern society’s social ills on the
rentier class, the single tax assured workers that they were not responsible for their
plight. Likewise, the single tax’s emphasis on one levy tied to land holdings appeared
to do away with the problem of granting increased discretionary power to the state.
With little land holdings, members of the working class, not surprisingly, were
attracted to George’s single tax ideas. Because of this attraction, reformist energies
and efforts were diverted from more practical and pragmatic tax reforms, particu-
larly progressive income taxes. As intellectuals and tax reformers attempted to point
out, George’s single-tax idea was, in the end, a narrow and conservative proposal—
one that used the rhetoric of anti-capitalism to disguise an adherence to a radical
individualism that eschewed the growth of a positive state. Though laborers and
other members of the producing classes differed in their commitment to the single
tax, much as they did with the tariff, they were generally ensnared by its attraction.
And, as a result, their representative organizations and leaders were slow to realize
that progressive income taxes were a much more progressive and viable fiscal
alternative.
Labor and the Single Tax
The allure of the single tax varied between labor leaders and their constituents.
Whereas many ordinary workers, who viewed land as the source of all wealth, were
quick to turn to the single-tax remedy, labor leaders were more skeptical of the
effectiveness of any single remedy and hence were more equivocal in backing
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George’s idea. Among the rank-and-file Knights of Labor, in particular, there seemed
to be a strong strain of support for George’s single-tax ideas. Ordinary members of
the Knights had been taught that ‘labor has a right to a just share of the wealth it
creates.’ The Journal of United Labor regularly circulated excerpts from George’s
Progress and Poverty and sold copies of his writings. Moreover, the preamble of the
Order’s constitution even demanded that ‘all lands now held for speculative pur-
poses be taxed to their full value.’ Richard Ely, the University of Wisconsin labor
economist, even observed that ‘tens of thousands of laborers have read Progress and
Poverty, who have never before looked between the two corners of an economic
book.’25
From all this, one could easily conclude, as the Knight Samuel B. Shaw from
Eastport, Maine did, that George’s single tax was the best way to curb the explosive
and exploitive growth in land values. ‘Landlordism can be rendered perfectly
harmless,’ Shaw wrote, ‘if it is compelled to return to the community in the shape
of a tax the money it demands from men as the price for the privilege of living.’ As
an ardent supporter of Henry George, Shaw went so far as to declare that the ‘single
tax on land values’ was ‘the only final solution of the labor problem.’26
Well into the 1890s when the AFL surpassed the Knights as the leading voice of
organized labor, the single tax continued to garner popular support among many
ordinary laborites. Indeed, the theme of reclaiming the social or communal value of
land held by speculators loomed large over the popular imagination of many
laborites. One anonymous worker animated this theme in verse:
Give back the land, the stolen land,
Ye know not how to hold;
To us it will yield food and life,
To you it yields base gold.
Remember that ye cannot claim
One acre or one sod;
Give back the land, the wretched cry,
Ye stole it from your God!27
Others put the desire to reclaim land from speculators in more legal terms. ‘Laws
that enable the land speculator to rob labor of its earnings,’ one labor reformer
wrote, ‘must be supplanted by the laws that place land under collective ownership,
through the appropriation of ground rents to be applied to the public welfare.’ And
still others saw the single tax as a way to address ‘the labor problem’ without
assenting to the ‘slavery of socialism.’28
For their part, national labor leaders were more pessimistic about the single tax.
The editors of the Knights’ journal, for instance, were much more ambivalent in
their support for the single tax than many rank-and-file members of the organiza-
tion. On the one hand, the editors supported the communitarian implications of the
single tax. ‘As we see it,’ they wrote in 1889, ‘justice demands that, as the whole
community have an equal right to the soil—the common heritage—those who use
should pay to the community exactly what the use is worth, leaving nothing for
landlords or any other parasitical class.’ They agreed, moreover, that the single tax
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on land values ‘would be an immense advance and materially better the condition
of the toilers.’29
Yet, the labor editors doubted whether the single tax would provide all the
cascading benefits that George and his disciples claimed for the levy. The editors did
not believe the single tax would ‘be sufficient of itself to give labor its full earnings
or anything approaching them.’ There were just too many social ills of modern
industrial urban life for one policy prescription. The single tax ‘will not cause an
exodus from the cities to the country,’ the editors intoned.
It will not enable those engaged in trades and city occupations to become independent
farmers. It will not prevent the masses of city toilers from being crushed and ground
between the upper and nether millstone of money monopoly and unrestricted
competition. It will not lessen by a cent the enormous sums drawn from labor by usury
in all its multifarious forms. The capitalist, the machine owner, the speculator will still
exact from the toiler the greater portion of his earnings. Much will remain to be done
in addition to taxing the soil to its full value so long as the control of capital and
machinery remain in the hands of the few.30
Eventually, most social reformers who were initially attracted to George and his ideas
would come to doubt the allegedly all-encompassing power of the single tax. Still,
the mix of support and opprobrium for the single tax sent contradictory signals, and
no doubt confused many members of the Knights and other labor unions.
If rank-and-file members of the Knights had any further reason to be confused
about the single tax, and the Order’s general policy towards political action, they
only needed to look so far as their national leader, Terence Powderly. Like many
other reformers, Powderly was attracted to the radical aspects of using a single tax
to attack land speculators and monopolists. As an admirer of Henry George’s
writings, Powderly throughout his life fixated on the issue of land monopoly,
claiming that this topic demanded more attention than any other.31 When he was
mayor of Scranton, Powderly attempted to implement a George-like land tax on
unearned increases in land value.32 And, in his capacity as leader of the order, he
urged local assemblies to take positive actions to confront the land issue.33
But Powderly’s most visible support for George and the single tax came when he
broke his own decree against political participation by backing Henry George’s
third-party candidacy for mayor of New York in 1886. Like other labor leaders,
including Samuel Gompers of the newly formed AFL, Powderly reluctantly joined
George’s campaign. On the eve of the election, Powderly agreed to give a speech at
the Cooper Union. Addressing a crowd that spilled out into the streets, Powderly
proudly proclaimed that George was his candidate and the candidate for the
workingman. ‘The burden of my song,’ Powderly declared, ‘is vote early tomorrow
morning for yourself, for your family, and for your God in the person of Henry
George. Set an example that will be remembered until your man is in the White
House at Washington.’34
To many in the audience, including the local members of the KOL, Powderly’s
enthusiastic support for George came as a welcomed surprise. Not only had the two
leaders differed greatly on such paramount issues as the tariff, Powderly also had
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officially denounced the Order’s alignment with any particular political party. The
rousing speech in favor of George seemed to change all that. But Powderly was quick
to point out—both publicly and in private—that his differences with George
regarding the tariff were irrelevant to the mayoral race, and that he supported
George not as chief officer of the Knights but as a concerned individual.35
Regardless of what Powderly’s intentions might have been, the support that he
and other labor leaders lent to George appeared to suggest the emergence of a new
political alliance. New York City’s Central Labor Union, the labor organization
responsible for placing George on the ballot, seemed to have forged a unique—albeit
fleeting—solidarity between labor activists, revolutionary socialists, and the single tax
movement.36 Ultimately, however, no such alliance would materialize. Not only did
George lose his mayoral bid—placing a strong second behind the Democratic
reformer Abram Hewitt and well ahead of the Republican candidate Theodore
Roosevelt—but the defeat also alienated many of George’s supporters, especially
labor leaders like Powderly and Gompers, who were reminded by the loss of the
frustrations of political alliances.
Despite George’s limited political success in 1886, it should come as no surprise
that labor leaders were reluctant to support George, and that more radical socialists
openly denounced his candidacy and the single tax idea.37 Henry George’s single tax
was based on a totalizing social theory that attempted to solve all the problems of
modern capitalism with a single panacea. Ultimately, the narrow means of relying on
only one solution to the myriad of problems confronting modern society revealed
the conservative anti-statist nature of George’s social theory. Put simply, Henry
George’s single tax retained a sense of radical individualism as it sought to address
what George saw as the root of all evil: the private appropriation of land rent. George
claimed that economic rent was often created not by improvements in the land but
by the increasing growth of society, and that this private appropriation of public
value was the cause of all the dislocations of modern industrial life; it was
responsible, in his view, for low wages, economic depressions, monopolies, and
above all else poverty itself.38
Like George, most members of the Knights were concerned with the just distri-
bution of wealth.39 But unlike George, many, including even Powderly, did not think
that solving the land question would remedy all the ills of modern industrial society,
or more importantly that collective action or state intervention should be discour-
aged. George, ultimately, was a laissez-faire ideologue who wanted to preserve the
sanctity of private property while limiting the actions of the state to the collection
of a single tax on economic rent. For the Knights and other labor organizations,
collective action and state regulation held out much greater promise. For example,
as one writer to the Journal of United Labor observed, taxation could be used not
only to raise revenue, but also to regulate the increasing concentration of wealth and
power.40 Similarly, laborites throughout the country disagreed with George’s ambiv-
alence towards capital; whereas many of them saw the eternal conflict of industrial-
ism as a battle between labor and capital, George seemed to counterpoise it as a
struggle between labor and land. Thus, the Knights of Labor and other trade-based
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unions endorsed the tax on land as just one small part of a much larger agenda
aimed at bettering the lives of the working class.
Labor’s dissatisfaction with the single tax appeared to grow steadily after George’s
failed bid for mayor; as it did, concepts like the income tax slowly became
increasingly attractive for urban workers. In the wake of the election, George and his
followers attempted to hijack the fledgling labor party by steering the organization’s
energies away from general industrial relations towards the single tax. Labor leaders
such as Gompers joined socialists in denouncing George’s attempts to transform the
labor party into a single tax party. ‘Henry George’s theory that the taxation of land
values will relieve the work-people employed in factories, mines and mills of their
present misery and poverty is a snare and a delusion,’ one labor newspaper declared.
‘No sensible trade unionist will take any stock in George’s patent medicine.’41 By
renouncing the single tax, the leaders of reform parties were creating the space
necessary to open up the social dialogue on tax policy. The progressive income tax
and other egalitarian fiscal measures such as the inheritance tax would only gain
currency in this social dialogue, however, if the popular support for the single tax
could be diminished. Unmasking George as a radical individualist was one thing,
completely discrediting the single tax was another, and the latter proved to be a
much more difficult challenge.
One reason why the single tax continued to have an unyielding hold on the
popular impressions of rank-and-file producers was surely because of its clarity and
simplicity. In contrast to what intellectuals and labor leaders had been saying about
the infeasibility of the single tax, quotidian workers could not resist its simple and
straightforward solution. Ordinary trade unionists, like Stephen Bell, could observe
their surroundings in the late 1890s at the tail end of the depression; they could see
the ‘poverty and helplessness of a large mass of our people’ in places like Brooklyn
and conclude that the ‘remedy is the single tax on the site value of land.’ Whether
it was frustration with their plight or whether it was their desire for latching on to
an idea that promised so much, many everyday producers believed deeply in the
single tax. For workers like Bell, the highbrow resistance to the single tax was
inexplicable. ‘I am tired of asking people to read the books of Henry George,’ Bell
complained. ‘The very clearness and simplicity of his scheme is a stumbling block to
labyrinthe yet feeble intellects who are looking for some extremely complicated
remedy for a badly complicated social disease. But if men would only really use the
little brains they have they might see that without a place (land) labor can do
nothing.’42
Some labor leaders did not take kindly to the rumblings of the likes of Stephen
Bell, and they responded in kind with their own harsh words against the naivete´ of
the single tax.43 Still, they could not completely extinguish the popular appeal of
Henry George and his ideas. This may, in fact, explain why the American labor
movement was not able to focus its energies on other tax issues, most notably the
income tax. Despite the efforts of labor leaders, the single tax remained a relatively
constant distraction. Although the KOL demanded graduated income taxes as part
of its official reform agenda and the AFL called for a more equitable distribution of
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tax burdens, these demands did not immediately translate into legislation.44 Income
tax proponents would have to wait until labor unions and agrarian associations
could unite in their support for tax reform before there was any hope of triggering
the social movement for a progressive income tax.
The Labor–Farmer Alliance and the 1894 Income Tax
Advocates of the income tax did not have to wait long, however. The imminent rise
of the People’s Party in the 1890s not only strengthened the ties within the
producing classes, it also invigorated the income tax movement. The rise and fall of
the alliance between organized labor and agricultural associations is a well-told story.
Scholars of American Populism and labor history have documented how members
of the KOL came together with farmers in the early 1890s to launch the People’s
Party, and how the reluctance of labor leaders such as Samuel Gompers and leading
socialists to join the party hampered its achievements from the beginning. The
conventional narrative also explains how the People’s Party realized significant, but
disappointing, electoral gains during the early and mid 1890s, only to have their
movement divided by internal strife, and their momentum absorbed by the Demo-
cratic Party in 1896 when it coopted many of the issues as well as the national
symbol of Populism, William Jennings Bryan.45
What is often neglected, however, in the standard account of the labor–farmer
alliance is how this potent, yet ephemeral, political alignment brought together the
key social movements supporting the creation of the new fiscal state. By transmitting
ideas about the income tax to its members, the People’s Party re-energized the
movement for progressive taxation. While its diverse membership included single-
taxers, as well as farmers, socialists, and of course laborers who benefited from the
tariff, the ‘demand’ for ‘a just and equitable system of graduated taxes on income’
was a prominent part of the Cincinnati, St Louis, and Omaha platforms that
launched the People’s Party.46 Over time, the national agenda of the People’s Party
would be absorbed and domesticated by the Democratic Party, but before the
Democratic Party usurped the calls for a progressive income tax, it was farmers,
laborers, and a long tradition of state and national third parties that moved the
taxation of income to the center of the political stage in the early 1890s.47
Yet, if the emergence of the People’s Party can be seen as adding fuel to the
Populist fire, it was economic conditions—namely the panic of 1893 and the ensuing
depression—that ignited the grassroots movement for the income tax. Marked by
many economic historians as ‘among the severest depressions in the United States,’
the contraction of the mid-1890s brought with it an unemployment rate of about 20
percent of the work force, a bank failure rate that was surpassed only by the Great
Depression, and a rate of general business failures that was utterly astounding to
most contemporary commentators.48 With a nation caught in an economic down-
turn, and with the Populists exerting pressure on the Democrats, who controlled
both the House and the Senate, a moderately graduated income tax law was enacted
in 1894. Using the technical aspects of the Civil War income tax as a model,
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Congress imposed a relatively low tax rate of 2 percent on all incomes and profits
above the rather high exemption level of US$4,000.49
Behind the rhetorical flourish of Congressional and Senate debates over the new
tax law, there was a wellspring of national support for the income tax from the
producing classes. Farmers and their agricultural associations led the way. Petitions,
like the one from the Kansas Farmers’ Alliance of Rile County, flowed into House
and Senate offices requesting that national lawmakers support the new income tax
legislation. Criticizing how the federal government had become overly reliant on
borrowing to fund its needs, the Kansas farmers requested a national tax on all
incomes above US$5,000—an exemption level that clearly put all common workers
out of reach.50 Similarly, agrarian associations in the Northeast also recognized that
an income tax could go a long way towards alleviating some of the uneven
distribution of fiscal burdens. A petition sent by a Massachusetts Grange to its
Congressional Representative on the Ways and Means Committees seemed to sum
up how many farmers felt: ‘The American Farmer has heretofore and is now paying
more than his just proportion of taxation, and believing that an internal revenue tax
upon incomes will tend to equalize the burden of taxation, Resolved: That the
members of Gramby Grange No. 157 Request our Representatives in Congress and
also our Senators to use their best efforts to place such a law upon the Statute Books
of our Country.’51
While the economic conditions of the 1890s and the labor–farmer alliance
certainly helped push the 1894 income tax law into being, enactment was neither
assured nor inevitable. There was, in fact, significant and substantial opposition to
the new income tax law, not surprisingly from business circles. In their locally
organized Chambers of Commerce, business leaders made it quite clear how they felt
about the new income tax provisions.
Leading the charge against the income tax was the Chamber of Commerce of the
State of New York. In its petition, which became the template for chambers of
commerce and boards of trade throughout the country, the New York businessmen
contended that it would be ‘unwise to impose a tax on incomes’ not only because
of the constitutional implications, but because the law would adversely impact the
most vulnerable persons of society, those on a fixed income. ‘The experience of the
year 1893 shows,’ the petition stated, ‘that the incomes of persons engaged in
agriculture, industry and trade vary with the prosperity of the country, so that people
generally do not know from one year to another how much they may have earned.
Persons who draw regular salaries, widows and orphans whose estates are managed
by Courts, and other persons living on fixed incomes, would sustain the brunt of this
burden, while they are least able to bear it.’52 The New York business leaders, of
course, neglected to add that the new law would only affect those individuals living
on an annual income above the relatively high exemption level of US$4,000, or that
the existing system of tariffs and consumption taxes already disproportionately
affected those ‘vulnerable persons’ listed in the petition. Nonetheless, countless
petitions from such organized business groups poured into Congressional offices.
This conservative opposition to the 1894 income tax suggests that the law in that
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year, and the eventual institutionalization of the income tax in the early twentieth
century, may not have been the product of ‘centrist’ or ‘corporate liberal’ influence,
as some modern scholars have contended.53 At least initially, it appears that centrist
politicians and representatives of corporate liberalism fought tooth and nail against
the imposition of an income tax. Indeed, because national politicians were able to
enact a tax that, with a high exemption level of US$4,000, affected only a small
fraction of the wealthiest Americans the working class of farmers and laborers was
able, in part, to graft its ideological position onto tax policy. Although the 1894 tax
law would be short-lived, with the Supreme Court striking down the law in the
following year, that initial post-Civil-War income tax would become the model not
only for the 1913 national income tax, but also for the first effective state-level
income tax in Wisconsin in 1911.54
The Response to Pollock
If the 1894 income tax symbolized the triumph of the producerist ideology or the
Populist Revolt in the realm of tax policy, the Supreme Court’s decision striking
down the law in the following year seemed to set back the income tax movement.
In Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company, the court struck down the 1894
income tax law as a violation of the direct tax clause of the US Constitution.55 Pollock
only seemed to reaffirm to many workers and farmers that they were fighting an
uphill battle not just against capitalists, but against the capitalist system.56
Characterizing the decision as ‘cowardly,’ S. B. Hoefgen of the AFL endorsed the
common belief that ‘the court undoubtedly leans, consciously or unconsciously, to
the interests of wealth and capital.’ The judiciary, Hoefgen claimed, was, after all,
part of the ruling elite. ‘The judges in their intercourse with their fellowmen are,
almost exclusively, with the class that is opposed to the income tax or a system of
bans that would tend to a more equal distribution of the products of labor,’ Hoefgen
continued. ‘So great is this influence that it must become the fixed policy of the
people to always elect a chief magistrate who will exert the influence of his office in
the appointment of judges, as vacancies occur, who will be swayed by the many
rather than by the few with whom they have personal intercourse.’57
Most members of the producing classes in 1895 probably did not follow all of the
technical legal details of the Pollock decision. The Court’s acrobatic maneuvers
around the direct tax and uniformity clauses of the Constitution—not to mention
the long line of precedent supporting income taxation—probably did not capture
the imagination of most quotidian workers. Still, understanding the effects of the
decision did not require any legal training. On its face, the Court’s conclusion
smacked of injustice. Even if the decision was the correct interpretation of the
constitution, many workers reasoned, its meaning was blatantly against the spirit of
the document. ‘If it is found that the vast revenues of the Astors, derived from rents,
can not be taxed,’ Hoefgen wrote, ‘while the tenants can be taxed on the income
derived from the business carried on on the real estate, the decision of the court
nullifies the preamble’ of the US Constitution. Hoefgen went on to recommend that,
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given the holding of the Court, ‘we should amend [the constitution] as speedily as
possible.’58
The editors of the American Federationist took their analysis of Pollock a step
further. Rather than criticizing the Court for striking down a statute that had the
potential to shift the burden of taxation onto those with a greater ability to pay, the
editors thanked the justices for doing away with a law that in their estimation was
not radical enough. As they saw it, because the 1894 income tax did not distinguish
between different sources of income, it was ‘at variance with the people’s desire.’
Since the law taxed income from labor and income from property equally, the
measure was not strong enough in redistributing wealth. Ignoring the fact that the
US$4,000 exemption level excused the vast majority of workers from paying the
income tax, the editors resolutely held to the principle—shared by many in the
laboring class as well as the academy—that those with ‘unearned’ income innately
had a greater ability to pay more taxes. Just as other tax reformers and theoreticians
sought to design a law that taxed the ‘unearned’ income from capital and other
property at a greater rate than the earnings from labor, the editors of the American
Federationist held out hope for a more robust income tax law. The editors thus
concluded that ‘the decision simply wipes out a law that was made odious to the
great mass of our people.’ Because of ‘the manifest injustice imposed upon many of
our people by the mutilated measure, we feel like tendering to the majority of the
United States Supreme Court our sincere thanks for their last kindly act in
connection with the so-called income tax law.’59
The American Federationist’s critique of Pollock seemed at odds with the general
opposition to the Supreme Court decision. But even if their comments were out of
the mainstream, their tone coalesced with the social movement for a constitutional
amendment overturning Pollock. As S. B. Hoefgen predicted, the decision acted as a
galvanizing force for income tax supporters. Soon after the decision, labor leaders
began focusing on how direct taxation in general could, indeed, be the best way to
alleviate the increasing concentration of wealth.
Though it would take well over a decade before income tax proponents could
solidify their support to ratify a constitutional amendment overturning Pollock, labor
leaders began to focus on the moral and ethical aspects of progressive income taxes
almost immediately after Pollock. After the Supreme Court decision, direct taxes on
income and inheritances became much more than simply a way to replace govern-
ment revenues lost by a revised tariff. Direct taxes were increasingly seen as the just
and ethical way not only to raise government revenue, but to halt the growing
concentration of wealth.60
Towards the end of the nineteenth century there was growing empirical evidence,
garnered by professional social scientists, attesting to the increasing concentration of
wealth in the nation. These social scientific studies, however, were not simply
academic discussions; they often seeped into the consciousness of rank-and-file
workers as they read their labor newspapers. The American Federationist, for
example, published an article soon after Pollock in the summer of 1895 that
summarized the findings of some of these recent studies. ‘Today the sun looks down
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on the most unequal and inequitable distribution of wealth that has probably ever
been seen,’ proclaimed Eltweed Pomeroy, the AFL writer. Citing the different studies
recently released, Pomeroy favored the one conducted by the lawyer and editor
Charles B. Spahr of New York. Acknowledging that Saphr was an ‘independent in
politics, with leanings toward the people’s party,’ Pomeroy amplified how Saphr’s
study of New York estates convincingly demonstrated that the disparity of wealth
had entered a new historical epoch.61
Among the primary causes of this new concentration of wealth, Pomeroy
identified ‘indirect and inequitable taxation, and special and monopoly privilege’ as
the most significant. Yet, Pomeroy’s recommendation was not to draft a consti-
tutional amendment to overturn Pollock, and hence to use progressive income taxes
to attack this consolidation of wealth. Rather, he put his faith in the progressive
inheritance tax. ‘There is only one remedy for the present condition, which is to take
the property when it has no owner, its former owner being dead,’ Pomeroy wrote.
‘This will gradually but surely produce a more uniform distribution of wealth, kill
the vain ostentation of enormous riches, check improper and harmful power, and
help to remove the discontent now festering so sorely in our fertile land.’ Not unlike
Henry George, Pomeroy seemed to rely completely on one levy as the solution to all
problems, fiscal and otherwise. The inheritance tax, ‘or charge, or duty,’ as Pomeroy
preferred to call it, is ‘of the highest social and economic justice, and, by making the
progression on its rate rapid, in a few generations a much more even and equitable
distribution of property can be attained, without injustice to any, and, at the same
time, the state supplied with an ample revenue.’62
While Pomeroy may have been as naive as George in thinking that one levy could
by itself address the growing disparity of wealth, his identification of indirect
taxation as the common enemy of the working class was consistent with the overall
feelings among most labor reformers. Indirect taxation was equated by many with
the tariff, and it was seen as the most inequitable form of taxation. Though
importers initially paid the duty, they easily passed along this tax as part of the final
price of their goods.
Even if many ordinary workers and farmers did not read the tax treatises of
lawyers and economic theorists, they were well aware of how indirect taxation
operated. Any reformer or worker leafing through the pages of the AFL’s official
newsletter would come to understand the injustices of indirect taxation. William H.
Johnson, the economic correspondent for the American Federationist, spelled out
quite clearly the insidious mechanics of indirect taxation. In a lengthy article
published soon after Pollock, Johnson articulated how ‘from the beginning,’ indirect
taxes like the tariff have ‘been a source of interminable strife, an inexhaustible
fountain of injustice, and one of the chief means by which colossal fortunes have
been built up at the expense of labor.’ Contending that indirect taxes ‘should never
have gained admittance into republican America,’ Johnson explained that direct
taxes, such as those on income, bore more directly to the transparency and
accountability of liberal democracies. In addition, direct taxes corresponded with
‘that first principle of taxation, which is, that all citizens should contribute to
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support of the government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective
abilities.’63
Measuring one’s tax obligations by the amount of one’s wealth or income was an
idea that seemed to resonate with Johnson. ‘Revenue being needed to bear the
expense of the government,’ he wrote, ‘the plain and honest thing to do is to assess
all citizens according to the amount of interest which they have at stake in the
maintenance of the state, outside of their own lives—that is, the amount of their
possessions or if you choose the extent of their pecuniary ability.’64 Indirect taxes
violated this fundamental principle of taxation by hiding the true costs of gover-
nance and shifting them to those least able to bear such costs. The tariff, in
particular, Johnson argued was
devised to draw the money from the working people chiefly, and then to cover up the
amount so taken, that they might be squeezed without knowing it. It was seen that if
a man should be taxed ten dollars for the privilege of wearing an overcoat, he would
rebel against such an outrage, but if, by any hocus-pocus, he could be prevailed on to
buy the garment, with the tax added to its original cost, he would not suspect the
extent of his robbery. This is the method of indirect taxation. It shifts the burden from
shoulder to shoulder, growing heavier all the time, until, at last, it sticks on the
shoulders of the consumer.65
In simpler terms, Johnson called indirect taxes a ‘system of disguised extortion.’
Though he did not explicitly endorse either an income or inheritance tax as the best
form of direct taxation, he stated that ‘the fairest system of taxation is the simplest
and openest.’66
Many within the farmer–labor alliance agreed with Johnson’s assessment. The
People’s Party had from its origins supported steeply progressive income taxes as a
way to attack the growing concentration of wealth. And in 1896 when the People’s
Party fused with the Democratic Party to support Bryan’s candidacy for president,
an income tax was part of the Democratic Party’s national platform for the first
time.67 The fusion of the independent People’s Party with the mainstream Democrats
was a mixed blessing for supporters of tax reform. On the one hand, the union
signaled the return of the income tax to the national political stage. No longer
limited to the dreams of independent third parties, the income tax in 1896 seemed
again to be a viable national policy prescription. Yet, the combination of the People’s
Party with the Democrats also came at a cost. By absorbing some of the Populists’
main policy recommendations such as the income tax and the strict control of
monopolies, the Democratic Party also domesticated their meanings. Potentially
radical measures were neutralized amidst the Democratic Party’s larger political
agenda. For example, Bryan’s singular focus on the silver question, as demonstrated
by his famous ‘Cross of Gold’ speech, marginalized many of these other issues,
including the income tax.68
Despite the ambiguous achievements of the income tax within the Democratic
Party, McKinley’s defeat of Bryan in 1896 was an unambiguous setback for tax
reform. The Republican Party, for the most part, refused to recognize the income tax
as a viable policy, and continued to use its tariff strategy to maintain protectionism.69
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Nevertheless, the calls for tax justice remained strong, though somewhat muffled,
among laborers and farmers. The alliance between producers seemed to crumble
after the 1896 presidential election, but the popular desire for tax justice continued.
The Road to the Sixteenth Amendment
The ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment not only was a long and arduous
process, but, more importantly, demonstrated how the income tax implicated
sectional and class differences. Getting three-fourths of the state legislatures to accept
the new amendment at a time when the political winds of state politics were rapidly
changing and when new states such as Arizona and New Mexico were being
admitted meant that the entire process would take nearly four years to complete.
While the amendment was introduced in 1909 by conservative lawmakers as a way
to forestall more radical tax reform, it was not until 1913 that the amendment was
ratified by the states. At the start, even many supporters of the income tax doubted
whether the amendment had the sufficient backing of enough wealthy industrial
states, particularly those in the Northeast and the Atlantic seaboard. Several states,
including New York, initially rejected the amendment only to reconsider it and
approve it in a subsequent or sometimes even the same legislative session.70
Proponents of the income tax understood that the fate of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment was hinged to tariff revision. Though tax reform at the time was generally
tinged with a moral and ethical basis, pragmatically an income tax was only
politically viable if it was tied to the economics of tariff reduction. Income tax
proponents retooled their rhetoric accordingly. Making radical redistributional
claims on behalf of direct taxes on income would surely lead to political failure.
Income tax supporters thus played down the redistributive potential of direct
taxation, and emphasized the anti-monopoly and economic arguments for an
income tax. Yet these reformers knew that replacing the regressive indirect consump-
tion taxes of the tariff with a direct tax on income was in itself a redistributional
process. Shifting even some of the fiscal burdens of financing a modern state from
the vast majority of working class consumers to earners of large incomes was one
way to alter the allocation of economic resources not only between classes but from
industry to agriculture and between different regions of the country.
To implement this subtle form of redistribution, tax reformers realized that before
they could institute a new fiscal order, they needed to emphasize how the working
class paid an inordinate amount of taxes under the prevailing tariff and consumption
tax regime. Discussion of the Sixteenth Amendment provided an opportunity to
underscore this point. The editors of the Washington Post, as early as 1906, described
how labor was the source of all wealth, and hence the principal source of govern-
ment revenues. ‘Labor pays all demands, and especially does labor pay taxes. The
world has no income except from labor, and the world pays its expenses from its
income.’ As an example of labor’s all-consuming burden, the editors pointed
naturally to the tariff. ‘Mr. John Wanamaker,’ the editors wrote, using the famous
Philadelphia retailer as an example, ‘imports from abroad immense invoices of
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ribbons and pays vast sums on them at the custom-house in discharge of tariff taxes.
Mr. Wanamaker does not perform that duty as a patriot or a philanthropist, but he
does it as a merchant. He shifts the tax, and the matrons and maidens who wear
those ribbons pay the tax on them.’71
Conservative forces opposed to the income tax did not sit idly by as tax reformers
cultivated support for the Sixteenth Amendment. Not only did opponents of the
income tax re-energize the Republican tariff strategy that held protectionism in place
through much of the nineteenth century, they also began using the income tax to
terrify the working class. Just as the business community in the 1890s claimed that
the income tax would harm the most vulnerable members of society, politicians and
newspaper editors during the ratification process contended that an income tax
would touch the working class as much as the wealthy.
Kentucky Governor Augustus O. Wilson mastered this rhetorical ploy when he
intervened in his state legislature’s discussions of the constitutional proposal. ‘There
is a popular fallacy that with a Federal income tax, it will be the Carnegies and
Rockefellers and other multi-millionaires who will pay for running the Government.
The poor man does not regard his wages or salary as “an income,” ’ Wilson
contended. ‘The fellow out West thinks that the rich man in New York is the one
who is going to pay this income tax;’ Wilson continued, ‘the man away from the rich
centers thinks that the burden will fall exclusively upon the rich centers. … The poor
man or the man in moderate circumstances does not regard his wages or salary as
an income that would have to pay its proportionate tax under this new system.’ In
Wilson’s estimation the income tax amendment gave ‘Congress the power to levy a
tax on the profits of farms, factories, stores, on the earnings of all men and women
in whatever work or calling, and on all other kinds of income.’ The income tax
would not herald a new fiscal order, according to Wilson; it would simply maintain
the current injustice in a new form. ‘Under our present system of taxation it is the
mass of the people who bear the burden, not the multi-millionaires. Under a Federal
income tax the same condition would exist.’ Although Wilson failed to explain
explicitly why the income tax would not alter the social affects of taxation, he seemed
to imply that once Congress was given the power to tax income it would naturally
eliminate any exemption level and tax the working class as much as the wealthy.72
Governor Wilson’s contentions did not fall on deaf ears. Organized labor had
always been cautious of granting too much discretionary power to the emerging
administrative state. The notion that the income tax could easily be transformed
from a class tax to a mass tax with lower exemption levels struck fear in the hearts
of many laborites. Conservative politicians were not the only ones making this
argument, however.73
Newspaper editors opposed to the income tax used similar tactics to dissuade
ratification of the amendment. Editors at the Wall Street Journal used the French
experience with income taxes to suggest that no one was safe from the pervasive
reach of an income tax. The editors admitted that with the recently instituted French
income tax ‘the French laborer finds the wealthy Frenchmen contributing of their
means to the revenues of the Government as never they did before.’ But the editors
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emphasized that the French working class were unaffected by their income tax
because of its high exemption level. By contrast, the American income tax, because
of constitutional restrictions, would have to be uniform. Through a rather distorted
reading of the ‘uniformity clause’ of the Constitution, the editors argued that any
exemption would be a violation of uniformity. Ignoring Supreme Court precedents,
the editors reiterated the claim made by David Wells many years earlier: that any
form of discrimination in applying the income tax was unfair. ‘The American
workingman for whom the advocates of the income tax feel so deeply, would,’ the
editors concluded, ‘find the collector of the tax demanding like percentage from him
on the whole amount of his income that would be demanded from his wealthier
neighbor.’74
These rhetorical threats about the application of the income tax against the
working class were, as it turns out, the last gasp for opponents of the Sixteenth
Amendment. By 1912 when the changing tide of American politics, and the split in
the Republican Party, ushered in Democratic control of Congress, the presidency,
and numerous state-level governments, the political support for the tariff regime
seemed to be crumbling. When Champ Clark of Missouri replaced ‘Uncle Joe’
Cannon as Speaker of the House in 1912, Democratic pro-income tax forces could
confidently claim that the triumph of the Sixteenth Amendment was in sight.
Indeed, Clark as a champion of free trade had long opposed the protective tariff even
when it benefited his constituents from Missouri’s zinc- and lead-mining industries.
Together with Joseph Bailey and Cordell Hull, Clark was one of the leading
Democratic national lawmakers supporting the income tax.75
With the ‘End of Republican Rule,’ as the New York Sun put it, the Sixteenth
Amendment sailed through ratification during the early part of 1913.76 Yet, the
amendment by itself did not determine the design of the new income tax laws. The
battle over the effectiveness of the new levy now moved within the national
legislative process, and here again the future fate of the income tax was tied to tariff
revision. Opponents of the tax, though they had lost the ratification battle, attempted
to moderate the bite of the new tax laws. Turning back to how the tariff protected
American industries and hence American workers, opponents of tax reform claimed
that an income tax coupled with tariff revisions would hurt industry and decrease
the demand for labor.
By this time, even the anti-income-tax New York Times had had enough of the
false promise of protectionism. Although the Times did not support the income tax,
its editors did firmly believe in free trade and they sought to allay any concerns that
an income tax tied to tariff revisions would harm American labor. ‘So far as the
workingmen are concerned,’ the editors wrote, ‘there is not the slightest reason for
apprehension. The duties needed for revenue will be quite large enough to prevent
a sudden and disturbing reduction of wages.’ As free traders, the editors believed, on
the contrary, that a reduced tariff could in fact help American labor. ‘With arbitrary
high cost of materials due to the tariff reduced, the industries of the United States
will have opened to them wider markets and will be placed on a more stable footing,
to the direct and indirect advantage of the workingmen.’77
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Socialist leaders of the working class, who had long been skeptical of the tariff, by
1910 had come to renounce the benefits of protectionism. Unlike the heads of the
mainstream national labor organizations, who held an ambivalent view towards
protectionism, socialists denounced the so-called benefits of the tariff for workers.
Victor Berger, the Milwaukee socialist who had been elected to the US House in
1910, maintained that ‘there is no such thing as protection to labor in any tariff bill.’
Speaking before his House colleagues, Berger explained how the tariff adversely
affected the working class. ‘Every tariff, high or low, means that it hits the poor man
worst. So long as a tax is placed on the necessities of life, it will fall upon the poor
man much more heavily than upon the rich man.’ Despite this criticism of the tariff,
even Berger realized that ‘free trade is no panacea.’ The long-lasting legacy of
protectionism in the United States meant that ‘there are whole communities built up
on tariff schedules on some manufactured commodity.’ Any drastic changes to this
trade policy would place these communities in jeopardy. Berger advised, instead, that
‘when society is willing to undertake the transfer of workers from a dying industry
to a flourishing one we can then welcome any radical change in the tariff that seems
best for the Nation as a whole.’78
Berger did not have to wait long. Although his dreams of a political economy that
consistently retrained displaced workers remained elusive, in 1913 significant tariff
reduction tied to an income tax became a reality. That first post-Sixteenth-Amend-
ment income tax was moderate in its exemptions and tax rates. It established a 1
percent tax on corporate and individual incomes above US$3,000 (US$4,000 for
married couples), and had progressive ‘surtax’ rates that peaked at 6 percent for
incomes over US$20,000.79
Nevertheless, the 1913 income tax law became the opening wedge of the new fiscal
order. National representatives of agrarian regions and working class Congressional
districts, who tried unsuccessfully to make that first income tax more radical, would
soon be able to point to the 1913 law as the beginning of the end of the old system
of federal taxation. Senator William Thompson of Kansas, one of the supporters of
a more radical income tax, presciently predicted that ‘when the income tax is firmly
established as a permanent law of the country, it should be greatly increased and the
amounts collected thereunder increased until most of the revenues of the country
may be derived from this source.’80 Similarly, during the Congressional debate over
the income tax, the Progressive Republican Ira C. Copley, who represented a large
working class district in northern Illinois, contended that steeply graduated income
taxes were ‘the best way of equalizing the opportunities which society in this country
offers to certain men in securing more than their fair share of the benefits derived
from the labors of other men.’ Unlike the tariff, which affected the working class
disproportionately, a highly graduated income tax, Copley argued, came directly
from swollen wealth. ‘If there is one tax which bears lightly on the shoulders of the
individual paying it, it is that which is paid out of a surplus income,’ Copley
proclaimed. ‘It galls no shoulders, though it will probably gall some hearts.’81
Although the high rates of taxation (peaking at 68 percent) that Copley recom-
mended were rejected by his Congressional colleagues in 1913, the lawmaker
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confidently predicted ‘that within 10 years some such law will be written on the
statute books of this country by the American Congress.’ Such laws, Copley
suggested, ought to be used not to supply the growing federal military appetite, but
to alleviate the burden of taxation on the common man and his family. He
recommended that the revenues from highly progressive federal income taxes ‘be
turned back to the various states to be used by them in lightening the burdens of
taxation of the poor and less fortunate people, and not as alms and charity but as
equalizing the burdens.’82
Copley, Thompson, and their fellow supporters of progressive taxation did not
have to wait as long as ten years for more radical income tax laws. With the onset
of the Great War, the new fiscal polity amassed an enormous amount of administrat-
ive as well as substantive taxing powers. The revenues from the wartime tax laws did
not go directly back to the states, as Copley had suggested. Instead, they were used
for the American military in its mobilization for the war, as Copley had feared.
Nevertheless, the highly progressive taxes of the First World War were only possible
because of the institutional beachhead established by the 1913 income tax law, and
because of the belated support that the income tax movement had from the
American working class.83
Conclusion
The social movements for tax reform at the turn of the twentieth century played an
important, though tentative, role in the creation of the modern American fiscal state.
As daily consumers of ordinary items, the mass of working class people were the
ultimate taxpayers of the nineteenth-century fiscal polity. Although the subtle and
silent nature of the regressive system of consumption taxes may have escaped the
notice of some people within the working class, the high cost of living due to this
regressive system of taxation did capture the attention of many social reformers.
Working within the producing class of farmers and laborers, these reforms high-
lighted the inequity of the prevailing tax structure.
Yet many of the leaders and rank-and-file members of the social movements for
tax reform did not see the income tax as an immediate solution to the fiscal
problems of the times. The long-lasting legacy of the protective tariff, and the
Republican Party’s entrenched national coalition supporting it, blurred the vision of
even the most ardent of income tax supporters. While the import duties penalized
workers and other ordinary Americans by imposing a higher cost of living,
these imposts also provided protection to many American workers and their
respective industries. The ingrained political and economic interests supporting the
protective tariff thus posed a challenging internal obstacle to the tax reform
movement.
Social reformers interested in addressing the inequities of public finance were
similarly distracted by other concerns. The overwhelming dominance of the ‘silver
question’ clouded any clear thinking on tax matters. But it was the allure of Henry
George’s single tax that blinded many laborites from seeing the income tax as a more
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palatable and equally potent way of attacking economic wealth and privilege.
Although the single tax may not have provided the same material benefits to the
working class that the tariff did, George’s conceptual focus on land taxation and his
radical rhetoric attacking monopoly power provided a psychological palliative for the
many working class Americans who were searching anxiously for a solution to the
modern problems of urban-industrial society. The single tax, in sum, seemed to
provide a simple moral and ethical vision of tax reform.
Thus, before the grassroots movements for an income tax could develop any
autonomous momentum, they had to first divorce themselves from the distractions
of the tariff, the single tax, and monetary reform. Of course, while the monetary
questions were resolved with the establishment of the gold standard, tax reformers
at the turn of the century would never be completely free from the pull of the single
tax or the tariff. Henry George’s idea for land taxation would eventually dissipate,
but the tariff with its links to international trade policy would remain a controversial
topic throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.
Still, tax reformers from the working class were able to voice their protests over
the prevailing system of taxation; they were able gradually to move the political
discussions of the income tax from the margins of social discourse to the center of
public policy. The momentous events of amending the US Constitution, creating an
early set of moderate though pivotal income tax laws, and then injecting this new
system of public finance with a robust redistributional edge during the First World
War all required a social commitment to go along with the many other forces that
were building the new fiscal order.
Through their ideas, their petitions, their voting power, and their support for
independent political parties, ordinary American tillers and toilers were able to effect
social, political, and legal change despite resistance from the affluent and economic
elite. Taking on the political and economic elites who were attempting to destroy or
domesticate the tax reform movement at every turn, quotidian farmers and laborers
were eventually able to unite, and to help supplant the nineteenth-century structure
of indirect federal taxation. They were able to provide the social, grassroots support
necessary to dismantle a regressive system of taxation and put in its place the
institutional foundations for a more egalitarian and progressive structure of public
finance. Four decades earlier John Sherman, the Chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee, could not have predicted that the producing class would have played
such a pivotal role as part of the ‘popular clamor,’ but the tone of his 1870 speech
could not have been more accurate—the public outcry for a fairer system of taxation
was indeed ‘more mighty than the waves of the sea.’
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